Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon:  Malicious prosecution suit can be brought for no-probable-cause charge even if other charges are valid

By Greg Mermelstein, Deputy Director & General Counsel, Missouri Public Defender

           Plaintiffs who are charged with multiple offenses – only one of which lacks probable cause – can still bring a malicious prosecution claim for the no-probable cause charge, the U.S. Supreme Court held June 20 in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon. 

           Jascha Chiaverini owned a jewelry store in Napoleon, Ohio.

           After he bought a stolen ring for $45 and refused to return it to its owner, Chiaverini got into a dispute with police, which ultimately resulted in him being arrested on three charges – two misdemeanors and felony money laundering.

           To support an arrest warrant, police submitted an affidavit making the case for probable cause on all three charges, but focusing primarily on the felony, which required proof that Chiaverini knew when he bought the ring that the transaction involved proceeds of unlawful activity.

           Chiaverini spent three days in jail on the arrest warrant, before prosecutors decided not to present the case to a grand jury, and dismissed it.

           Chiaverini sued police under Section 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.  This required him to show that his arrest was without probable cause.

           Chiaverini argued the money laundering charge lacked probable cause.

           But the District Court and Sixth Circuit denied his claim because the two misdemeanors were supported by probable cause.

           So long as probable cause supported at least one charge, his malicious prosecution claim fails, the Sixth Circuit ruled.

           The Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve a circuit split.

Holding

           In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held a malicious prosecution claim can be brought if even one of the charges lacked probable cause.

           If “an invalid charge – say, one fabricated by police officers — causes a detention either to start or to continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated,” the Court said.  “And that is so even when a valid charge has also been brought.”

           “Consistent with both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, courts should evaluate suits like Chiaverini’s charge by charge,” the Court said.

           The inclusion of a baseless charge – even though brought along with good charges – may unreasonably extend a person’s unlawful pretrial detention, the Court said.

           The more complex question, the Court said, is the element of causation.

           A “Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution suit depends not just on an unsupported charge, but on that charge’s causing a seizure – like the arrest and three-day detention here,” the Court said.

           The parties offer differing views on how causation should be shown, the Court said. 

           Chiaverini proposes that when a valid and invalid charge are brought before a judge, the warrant the judge issues is irretrievably tainted, so any detention based on that warrant is invalid.

           The Solicitor General proposes a “but-for” test based on whether the judge “would” have authorized a warrant had the invalid charge not been present.

           Finally, the police propose a stricter test of whether, absent the invalid charge, the judge “could” have legally authorized the detention, regardless of what the judge actually “would” have done.

           But the causation issue was not addressed by lower courts, the Court said.  “[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”

           The Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s opinion and remanded for further proceedings.

Dissents

           Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented.  They said Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims should not be recognized at all. 

           Justice Gorsuch also dissented.  He said malicious prosecution claims were a new tort of the Court’s “own recent invention,” and “it is hard to know where this tort comes from.”

           “Stare for as long as you like at the Fourth Amendment and you won’t see anything about prosecutions, malicious or otherwise,” he said.

           “That is not to say no constitutional hook exists for a Section 1983 claim addressing the malicious use of process,” he said.  “Rather, it seems to me only that such a claim would be more properly housed in the Fourteenth Amendment.”

           “After all, unlike the Fourth Amendment, that provision does focus on judicial proceedings, guaranteeing those who come before our courts ‘due process’ of law,” he said.

           But most such claims should be brought in state court, Gorsuch said.  “After all, when a State provides exactly the tort claim the plaintiff seeks, it provides him with all the process he is due.”

           A federal court should hear a Section 1983 claim only if the state fails to provide for such a claim, or fails to provide a fair forum for hearing such a claim, Gorsuch said.