Olivier v. City of Brandon:  Sec. 1983 doesn’t bar people from seeking to enjoin future enforcement of same law under which they were convicted

By Greg Mermelstein, Deputy Director & General Counsel, Missouri Public Defender

            Persons with criminal convictions can bring a Sec. 1983 action to enjoin future enforcement of the law under which they were convicted so long as they are seeking only prospective relief, the U.S. Supreme Court held March 20 in Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi.

            Gabriel Olivier, a “street preacher,” was previously convicted of violating a Brandon city ordinance which prohibited “protests” or “demonstrations” outside of “designated protest areas.”  Olivier did not appeal, paid a fine, and served no prison time.

            Because Olivier still wanted to preach outside of the “designated protest area”, he filed a Section 1983 suit, alleging the ordinance violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.  He sought an injunction prohibiting the city from enforcing the ordinance in the future.

            The city argued Olivier’s suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey (1994).  Heck held a person previously convicted of violating a statute can’t challenge its constitutionality under Sec. 1983 because success in the suit would cast doubt on the prior conviction’s correctness and constitute an improper collateral attack on the prior conviction.

            The District Court agreed with the city. 

            The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Holding

            The Supreme Court reversed, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Kagan.

            Olivier’s case turns on the Court’s language in Heck that when a previously-convicted person seeks damages in a Sec. 1983 suit, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”  Such 1983 suits are barred because they are really collateral attacks on the prior conviction, which can only be brought in habeas corpus proceedings.

            But Olivier’s suit is different, the Court said, because Olivier seeks only prospective injunctive relief to be free from prosecution for future violations of the ordinance.

            That “falls outside habeas’ core – and likewise outside Heck’s concerns”, the Court said.

            Unlike habeas suits, Olivier’s 1983 suit is not a collateral attack on his prior conviction, and doesn’t risk “conflicting judgments” over his prior conviction, the Court said.

            Olivier’s suit is not about what Olivier did in the past and doesn’t require any proof of his prior conduct, the Court said. 

            The Court acknowledged that the broad language in Heck “fits” Olivier’s situation, since if Olivier succeeds in his suit, it would mean his prior conviction was unconstitutional.

            But that just shows the Court’s “phrasing” in Heck “was not quite as tailored as it should have been”, the Court said.

            “This Court has often cautioned that ‘general language in judicial opinions should be read as referring in context to circumstances similar to the circumstances then before the Court and not referring to quite different circumstances that the Court was not then considering.’”

            Heck did not consider a suit seeking entirely prospective injunctive relief, the Court said, so “the Heck language was not meant to address it.”

            If Olivier weren’t able to bring his suit, he would face the dilemma of either flouting the ordinance and risking another prosecution, or forgoing constitutionally protected speech, the Court said.