Snyder v. U.S.:  Federal corruption statute doesn’t prohibit “gratuities” to state and local officials

By Greg Mermelstein, Deputy Director & General Counsel, Missouri Public Defender

           The federal statute which prohibits state and local public officials from corruptly accepting anything of value with the intent to be influenced or rewarded for an official act prohibits bribes, but not gratuities, the U.S. Supreme Court held June 26 in Snyder v. United States.

           Bribes are payments made or agreed to before an official act in order to influence a public official with respect to that act.

           Gratuities are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation.

           Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666 makes it a crime, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, for a state or local official to “corruptly” accept “anything of value” from a person “intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act.

           James Snyder was the Mayor of Portage, Indiana. 

           Like many states, Indiana state law criminalizes bribery of state public officials, but regulates acceptance of gratuities through a State Code of Ethics, and civil penalties such as fines, reprimands or disqualification from state employment.

           Indiana does not impose criminal or civil prohibitions on local officials who accept gratuities, but leaves such regulation to local governments.

           The City of Portage set limits on the amount gratuities an official could accept, but also allowed public officials to hold outside employment.

           Mayor Snyder accepted a $13,000 check from a truck manufacturer which had won a city contract to sell trucks to Portage.  Snyder claimed the money was for outside work he performed for the truck company.

           Snyder was not charged by state prosecutors for bribery, and was never disciplined by the City of Portage for violating any city gratuity rules.

           Nevertheless, the federal government charged Snyder with violating Sec. 666 for accepting the $13,000.  He was convicted at trial of accepting an illegal gratuity, and sentenced to almost two years in prison.

           On appeal, Snyder argued that Sec. 666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities.

           The Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed his conviction.

           The Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve a circuit split.

Holding

           In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court reversed.

           “American law generally treats bribes as inherently corrupt and unlawful”, the Court said.  “But the law’s treatment of gratuities is more nuanced.”

           Some gratuities can be “problematic” and raise “ethical concerns”, the Court said.  But others – such as a family giving a holiday tip to the mail carrier or parents giving a gift basket to their child’s teacher – are “commonplace” and “innocuous.”

           “Not surprisingly, different governments draw lines in different places” regarding gratuities, with some governments banning them altogether, and others allowing them in certain amounts, the Court said.

           “The question in this case is whether 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities”, the Court said.  “The answer is no.”

           “Six reasons – taken together, lead us to conclude that Sec. 666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute – text, statutory history, statutory structure, statutory punishments, federalism and fair notice.”

           Regarding text, Sec. 666 requires a “corrupt” state of mind, which makes it more like the bribery statute that covers federal officials, the Court said.

           The statute’s history also shows that Congress modeled it on the bribery statute for federal officials, not the gratuities statute for them, the Court said.

            The structure of the statute would also be “highly unusual, if not unique” if it were interpreted to cover both bribery and gratuities, since these are generally separate crimes with separate elements, the Court said.

           Regarding punishment, the federal statute for federal officials has higher penalties for bribery and far lower ones for gratuities to reflect the “relative seriousness” of the two offenses, but Sec. 666 has a single, high punishment, the Court said.  “If the Government were correct that Sec. 666 also covered gratuities, Congress would have created an entirely inexplicable regime for state and local officials.”  

           “We cannot readily assume that Congress authorized a 2-year sentence for say, a Cabinet Secretary who accepts an unlawful gratuity while authorizing a 10-year sentence on a local school board member who accepts an identical gratuity”, the Court said.  “What sense would that make?”

           “Interpreting Sec. 666 as a gratuities statute would significantly infringe on bedrock federalism principles”, the Court continued. 

           State and local governments “have adopted a variety of approaches to regulating state and local officials’ acceptance of gratuities” which “would be gutted if we were to accept the Government’s interpretation of Sec. 666”, the Court said.

           Finally, the “Government’s interpretation of the statute would create traps for unwary state and local officials” and not give them “fair notice”, the Court said.

           “The Government simply opines that state and local officials may not accept ‘wrongful’ gratuities,” the Court said.  “But that is no guidance at all.”

           “Is a $100 Dunkin’ Donuts gift card for a trash collector wrongful?  What about a $200 Nike gift card for a county commissioner who voted to fund new school athletic facilities?”

           “The Government’s so-called guidance would leave state and local officials entirely at sea to guess about what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law with the threat of up to 10 years in federal prison if they happen to guess wrong,” the Court said.  “That is not how federal criminal law works.”

           Lastly, the Court rejected the Government’s “familiar plea that federal prosecutors can be trusted not to enforce this statute against small-time violators.”

           “[A]s this Court has said time and again the Court cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will use it responsibly.”

Other Opinions

           Justice Gorsuch concurred, but wrote separately to note that although it goes “unnamed,” the Court’s opinion is guided by the rule of lenity.

           “[A]ny fair reader of this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about whether it covers the defendant’s charged conduct”, Gorsuch said.  “And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for the prosecutor but for the presumptively free individual.”

           Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented.

           “To reach the right conclusion we need not march through various auxiliary analyses”, Jackson said.  “We can begin – and end – with only the text.”

           The plain language of the statute prohibits state and local public officials from “corruptly” accepting “anything of value” with the intention to be “influenced or rewarded”, Jackson said.  “[E]veryone knows what a reward is.” 

           “A reward often says ‘thank you’ or ‘good job’”, Jackson said. 

           “The Court’s reasoning elevates nonexistent federalism concerns over the plain text of this statute and is a quintessential example of the tail wagging the dog”, Jackson said.